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A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
Is any unified theory of brain function
possible? Following a line of thought dat-
ing back to the early cybernetics (see,
e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has
proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical
Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account
to be pursued in the effort of gain-
ing the “Grand Unified Theory of the
Mind”—or “painting the big picture,”
as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of
thought is indeed appealing, but to be
effectively pursued it should be confronted
with experimental findings and explana-
tory capabilities (Edelman, 2012).
The point we are making in this note
is that a brain with predictive capa-
bilities is certainly necessary to endow
the agent situated in the environment
with forethought or foresight, a crucial
issue to outline the unified account advo-
cated by Clark. But the capacity for fore-
thought is deeply entangled with the
capacity for emotions and when emo-
tions are brought into the game, cogni-
tive functions become part of a large-scale
functional brain network. However, for
such complex networks a consistent view
of hierarchical organization in large-scale
functional networks has yet to emerge
(Bressler and Menon, 2010), whilst het-
erarchical organization is likely to play
a strategic role (Berntson et al., 2012).
This raises the necessity of a multilevel
approach that embraces causal relations
across levels of explanation in either direc-
tion (bottom–up or top–down), endors-
ing mutual calibration of constructs across
levels (Berntson et al., 2012). Which, in
turn, calls for a revised perspective on
Marr’s levels of analysis framework (Marr,
1982). In the following we highlight some
drawbacks of Clark’s proposal in address-
ing the above issues.
THE LARGE-SCALE NETWORK OF
EMOTION AND COGNITION
Indeed, emotions are a major factor in
providing valuable implicit or explicit
knowledge for making fast and advan-
tageous decisions (e.g., Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). However, the under-
standing of interaction and integration
between cognition and emotion requires
a more quantitative analysis of structural
and functional brain connectivity (Pessoa,
2008). Brain regions classically related
to cognition (e.g., visual areas) become
part of a large-scale functional brain
network. Specific regions are involved
in many functions, and functions are
carried out by many regions; the map-
ping between structure and function
is both pluripotent (one-to-many) and
degenerate (many-to-one).
Such heterarchical architecture involves
the multiple levels of processing and
the organizational continuity across lev-
els of the brain, while capturing the
important distinction between levels of
organization and levels of processing.
Graph-theoretic studies of functional
connectivity have suggested that human
large-scale functional brain networks
can be usefully described as small-
worlds (Bressler and Menon, 2010).
Hierarchical graphs have been useful
in characterizing subnetwork topolog-
ical properties although, even in the
case of primary visual areas—“pinnacles
of modularity”—computational mod-
els that assume a purely hierarchical
structure have failed to provide a
good fit to the existing latency data
(Capalbo et al., 2008). A consistent view
of hierarchical organization in large-
scale functional networks has yet to
emerge.
Thus, the conjecture of a hierarchi-
cal, bidirectional architecture as the most
plausible neural implementation, con-
ceived at first for a HPC model of V1–V2
visual processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999),
must be confronted with the evidence
of heterarchical and multi-relational rela-
tionships among regions. In a large-scale
perspective, emphasizing, as Clark does,
interactions between regions supported
by direct, robust structural connections
is misleading: the strength of functional
connectivity is equally important, and
might deviate from that of the structural
connection.
This has led to consider the articu-
late mapping from brain structure to
behavioral performance at different lev-
els of explanation, such as brain regions,
neural computations and behaviors
(Pessoa, 2008). A “calibrative reduc-
tionism” is likely to represent a better
strategy, to facilitate the multidisciplinary
experimental findings (Berntson et al.,
2012). This means that a multilevel
approach should embrace causal rela-
tions across levels in either direction
(bottom–up or top–down) with a mutual
calibration of constructs across levels of
analysis.
LEVELS OF EXPLANATION IN
LARGE-SCALE NETWORKS
The multilevel approach to complex
networks calls for a revised perspective
on Marr’s (1982) three levels of anal-
ysis framework—the what/why level
(computational theory), the how level
(algorithm), the physical realization
(implementation)—which is explicitly
addressed by Clark.
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It has been argued (Chater et al.,
2006; Boccignone and Cordeschi, 2007)
that taking a Bayesian approach (and
Clark himself endorses it), in the light
of how this is currently applied in the
research practice, results in a subtle con-
ceptual shift with respect to the original
Marr’s proposal. Guessing a hypothesis
space, priors, likelihoods, and cost func-
tions that supply the problem’s solution,
results in a richly structured representa-
tion of the cognitive task, shaped in the
form of a probabilistic graphical model
(PGM: Wainwright and Jordan, 2008).
PGMs, in turn, beyond their use as a
language for formulating models, play a
fundamental role in assessing computa-
tional complexity and feasibility of infer-
ence algorithms (supporting either exact
or approximated Bayesian computations)
in terms of the structural properties of the
graph.
Thus, the notion of architecture (func-
tional/structural) becomes a central tenet
in the modern Bayesian approach, in defi-
ance of Marr’s methodological effort to
provide a careful separation between lev-
els. Indeed, this representation becomes
a key issue to account for causal rela-
tions across levels. In particular, heterar-
chical architectures are likely to involve
hybrid graph-theoretic representations,
that might mix directed PGMs (suitable
to represent hierarchies) with more flex-
ible undirected models, and in which
exact inference algorithms are used locally
within an overall approximated sam-
pling framework (Wainwright and Jordan,
2008). In such a composite picture, HPC
hardly provides the “germ of an answer”
to Marr’s quest for a systematic approach
addressing all levels of explanation, as
claimed by Clark.
Moreover, we believe that there is some
ambiguity in Clark’s account. In certain
cases HPC is treated as a model, a “driv-
ing force,” as Clark puts it, relying upon
prediction-error minimization and oper-
ating on a representation shaped in terms
of probability density distributions; other
times HPC is intended as a strategy; occa-
sionally, it is taken for what we believe
actually is: a computationally tractable
approximation to full Bayesian inference.
In a Bayesian framework, rather than
being the unifying principle, HPC is noth-
ing but one possible explanation (among
others) at the algorithmic level.
Summing up, sticking in advance to
one hierarchical representation is some-
how problematic, if one has the ambi-
tion of addressing large-scale issues such
as social cognition and consciousness, and
ultimately, attack the problem of a “Grand
Unified Theory of the Mind.”
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